The impossibility proof on unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is critically reviewed. Different ways of obtaining secure protocols are indicated.
Introduction
There is a nearly universal acceptance of the general impossibility 1−4 of secure quantum bit commitment (QBC), taken to be a consequence of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type entanglement cheating which rules out QBC and other quantum protocols that have been proposed for various cryptographic objectives. Since there is no characterization of all possible QBC protocols, logically there can be no general impossibility proof as maintained to this date. In this article, which is based on Ref. [5] , we explain the nature of various gaps and incompleteness in the impossibility proof, in addition to this a priori logical point. They should make clear the fact that there is no impossibility theorem even in the absence of a specific protocol that has been proved unconditionally secure. But we also describe an unconditionally secure protocol QBC1 and other possible approaches for obtaining secure protocols.
The impossibility proof
The essential ideas that constitute the impossibility proof are generally agreed upon. 1−4 Adam and Babe have available to them two-way quantum communications that terminate in a finite number of exchanges, during which either party can perform any operation allowed by the laws of quantum physics. 
This condition (1) says that, for any ǫ > 0, there exists an n 0 such that for all n > n 0 ,P B c − 1/2 ≤ ǫ andP A c ≤ ǫ, to which we refer as ǫ-concealing and ǫ-binding. These cheating probabilities are to be computed purely on the basis of physical laws, and thus would survive any change in technology, including any increase in computational power. One can write down explicitlȳ
The lower bound in (2) yields the impossibility proof 1, 7
When random numbers known only to one party are used in the commitment, they are to be replaced by corresponding entanglement purification.
For a random k, it is argued from the doctrine of the "Church of the Larger
Hilbert Space" 4 that it is to be replaced by the purification |Ψ in
where the |f k 's are complete orthonormal in H B 2 kept by Babe while H
would be sent to Adam. Similar purification is to be used for performing any operation during commitment that might otherwise require an actual measurement. As a consequence, it is claimed that a shared state |Φ b at the end of commitment is known to both parties.
It appears that there are many incompleteness in the impossibility proof.
For example, one may observe that the cheating probabilityP It has to be decided what would happen when cheating is detected, say in a game-theoretic formulation. It makes no sense to keep trying until one party's cheating is not detected; some limit on the number of detected cheats must be imposed. Assuming both parties are honest not trying to cheat, which is what the impossibility proof formulation does except for Adam to form entanglement instead of sending one |φ bi , also makes no sense because there would then be no need for a protocol. (Actually, the |φ bi entanglement step is often mistakenly described as an honest one.) These possibilities have not been accounted for. In the discussions of a proper framework for QBC protocols in Ref. [5] , we have codified some intuitively valid rules for protocol formation under the names Intent Principle and Libertarian Principle. In the following, we will discuss several of the many gaps in the impossibility proof. 
No impossibility theorem without QBC definition

Unknown versus random parameter
The impossibility proof regards any unknown number to one party as a random variable with a known probability distribution, from which the purification (4) may be formed. However, as it is well-known in classical statistics, not every unknown parameter is a random variable. In the present situation, there is an infinite number of open possibilities, such as the number of states and operations available, that admits no uniform probability distribution or actual entanglement for the purpose of EPR cheats. Furthermore, there is simply no ensemble here for the unknown parameter to be averaged over.
In an analogous situation in the quantum information literature, this error has been recently called the "Partition Ensemble Fallacy Fallacy" 9 . More significantly, there is no need for Adam to know the probability {λ k } under concealing for every {λ k }. The proper approach is to regard the state |Ψ of (4) as an unknown "parameter" in an infinite space. The other party does not need to know it, or to know its probability distribution even if it has one, because of the following Secrecy Principle which is a corollary of the Intent Principle and Libertarian Principle.
Secrecy Principle: A party does not need to reveal a secret parameter chosen by her in whatever manner if it does not affect the security of the other party, who cannot reject the protocol on such a basis.
Thus, generation of the secret parameter can be automatized by one party, and it can be kept secret just as Adam can keep his bit b secret or a secret key can be kept secret in standard cryptography.
Indeed, with the use of (4) by Babe, it is not sufficient for concealing to assume that one fixed |Ψ is used by her as done in the impossibility proof. Two examples are given in Ref.
[6], which show that Babe can cheat by using another {λ k } or |Ψ than the one prescribed, and nothing in the impossibility proof formulation prevents her from doing that. If one imposes the condition that the protocol is ǫ-concealing for every possible choice of |Ψ , then there is no impossibility proof until one shows that there is a cheating transformation for Adam which will work for every possible |Ψ . In the case of perfect concealing, this has been proved 6 for a single use of (4) by Babe.
The corresponding ǫ-concealing case is yet to be resolved. See the article by G. M. D'Ariano in this volume for a quantitative discussion.
Note that the Secrecy Principle directly contradicts the claim that a pure |Φ b is openly known at the end of commitment. One consequence is that because Babe does not know {p bi }, the usual specification of the concealing condition is a sufficient but not necessary one needed for a general impossibility proof. Furthermore, one has to show that whatever information Adam lacks on |Φ b , such as the |f k of (4), is not needed for his cheating. Observe also that (4) is not equivalent to the mere generation of |ψ k with probability λ k , due to the presence of off-diagonal terms |f k f k ′ |. Such purification has to be considered because of possible entanglement cheating, not because of the Church of the Larger Hilbert Space. Indeed, entanglement may help determine the bit through such terms, as the example in the next section shows. Even with the Church, the two cases are not equivalent. Using the upper bound in (2) the security condition can be expressed as
To preserve the impossibility proof one would need to show that, in addition
. Clearly, this has not been proved.
As an example, consider the case
where {|1 , |2 , |3 , |4 } are, e.g., a fixed set S 0 of four possible BB84 states on a given great circle of a qubit. Adam permutes each |ψ k by one of four possible P m , and returns the first qubit to Babe unchanged for b = 0, while shifted by π in the great circie for b = 1. Assume first that Babe either did not entangle, or cannot use her entanglement in H B 2 . Then ρ
1 (ψ k ) for all k, and no entanglement of permutations would produce a rotation on the first qubit while not disturbing the others. Thus, Adam cannot cheat perfectly and has a fixedP A c for this protocol which is not arbitrarily close to one, even though it is perfectly concealing. If one can find a case in which the protocol remains perfectly concealing with entanglement by Babe, which is not the case in this example, (IP) of (3) would be contradicted, and the case can be extended to become an unconditionally secure protocol by repeating it in a sequence. Such a case can indeed be found in this kind of protocols which we call Type 2.
Protocol QBC1
If carried out honestly, this protocol is conceptually simple and works as follows. 5 Adam sends Babe n qubits with states selected randomly and independently from S 0 . Babe then picks randomly one of these qubits and sends it back to Adam, who would leave it unchanged or shift it by π, depending on whether b = 0 or 1, and commit it as evidence. He opens by revealing b and all the qubit states, and Babe verifies by corresponding measurements.
We assume that no cheating by either party, other than entanglement, occurs during commitment as in the impossibility proof formulation, say, under heavy penalty in a game-theoretic formulation where state checking is done by both parties. Thus the protocol is perfectly concealing. There are many ways for Babe to randomly pick one of the n qubits, say by permutation into a fixed qubit among the n ones, or into a separate fixed qubit, each with its own purification. If Adam knows which particular way Babe chooses, it can be shown that he can cheat successfully. However, his success depends crucially on this knowledge, and no further entanglement purification by Babe is possible over these different ways that would allow her to send back a single qubit to Adam for bit modulation. While the situation here has some similarity to our Type 3 protocols, 5 , it is one that cannot be completely purified even with a known probability distribution, and the impossibility proof does not apply. Thus, the protocol becomes ǫ-binding for large n. A full security proof of this protocol and detailed treatment of Type 2 protocols will be presented elsewhere.
